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INTRODUCTION 
United States business entities that engage in business relationships 
with business entities owned by foreign governments, sometimes called 
state-owned enterprises, should be mindful of the legal hurdles over 
which they may need to jump. These hurdles appear as a result of 
litigation ensuing with foreign governments and their state-owned 
entities.1  
Some of these procedural and practical hurdles include the following: 
• Litigation will invariably be costly and time consuming.  
• Service abroad may be dependent on the particular country where 
service is to be effected and whether that particular country is a 
signatory of a certain treaty;2 e.g., the Inter-American Convention on 
Letters Rogatory and Additional Protocol, the 1965 Convention on 
the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil 
or Commercial Matters (Hague Service Convention), and the 1963 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocols. 
• Service on a state-owned enterprise is governed exclusively by the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA or the Act), which provides 
for a four step hierarchical structure for service of process on the 
“foreign state.”3 
• Service abroad on a foreign business entity may take months to 
effectuate and may involve translation of pleadings. Service may 
additionally be prolonged when litigants are required to go through 
the appropriate diplomatic channels. 
• Even if service is effected, a state-owned enterprise may raise the 
defense of sovereign immunity under the FSIA, which in turn, may 
  
 1. Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA or the Act), foreign 
states, sovereigns, and their governments, including political subdivisions, agencies, and 
instrumentalities, are immune from suit by means of jurisdiction, unless a statutory 
exception applies. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (2005); 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976); see also 28 
U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2008) (listing general exceptions). In this Article, the term “foreign 
sovereign” is regarded as referring to nations, territories, and governments, whereas the 
term “foreign state” is expressly defined under the Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). See also 
discussion infra Part III (regarding the definition of “foreign state” under the Act). 
 2. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b)(2) (1976). 
 3. Id. § 1608(a)(1)–(4). 
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further delay litigation and involve costs to defend against a claim, 
which if denied, is subject to an immediate appeal.4  
A.  Service 
Several critical issues must be kept in mind when serving any 
defendant abroad before questions of immunity can be addressed, even 
when the defendant is a foreign government. In Volkswagenwerk AG v. 
Schlunk, Justice O’Connor, writing for a unanimous court, held where 
service is to be effected in a Hague member state, the strictures of the 
Hague Service Convention must be followed.5 Following the Convention 
is not optional; instead, it is mandatory6 and its methods are exclusive.7 
Therefore, while going through the defendant state’s Central Authority 
may in some instances be avoided, the Convention must be honored. 
Further, where alternative methods of service are available,8 all methods 
carry different benefits and risks. The unique characteristics of each 
country and each method are touched upon in the grid in the Appendix to 
this Article; however, the Appendix is not intended to be a 
comprehensive guide.  
B.  Service by Mail  
The most heavily litigated issue in the Hague service arena is the 
validity of service by mail under Article 10(a) of the Hague Service 
Convention.9 The Eighth and Fifth Circuits have held (arguably 
  
 4. Kensington Int’l Ltd. v. Itoua, 505 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2007); see also 28 
U.S.C. § 1602 (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 1604; Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kullman, 853 
F.2d 445, 451 (6th Cir. 1998) (discussing an automatic right to appeal under the FSIA 
pertinent to the collateral order doctrine). 
 5. See 486 U.S. 694, 707 (1988) (interpreting the Convention on Service Abroad 
of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters art. 10, Nov. 
15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361 [hereinafter Hague Service Convention]). 
 6. Id. at 699. 
 7. Id. at 706. 
 8. Hague Service Convention, supra note 5, art. 10. 
 9. Article 10 of the Hague Service Convention is subject to a circuit split. See 
Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp., 889 F.2d 172, 173–74 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that 
mail is an invalid method of service under the Hague Convention); Nuovo Pignone, SpA 
v. Storman Asia M/V, 310 F.3d 374, 384–85 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that mail is 
an invalid method of service under the Hague Convention); Ackermann v. Levine, 788 
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incorrectly) that, due to a drafting error in Article 10(a), mail service is 
invalid under the Convention.10 The Second and Ninth Circuits take the 
opposite (arguably correct) view, posing a very simple question: why 
would service via mail have a sub-article all to itself if it were not 
valid?11  
Obviously, foreign Central Authorities, which are designated agencies 
tasked with executing service requests under Article 5 of the 
Convention,12 have the prerogative to refuse to serve their own 
governments, and they occasionally do.13 In such cases, section 1608 of 
the FSIA seems to require that service by mail be attempted under 
sections 1608(a)(3) and (b)(3).14 However, proper adherence to the 
Convention is still necessary—and where the foreign government objects 
to Article 10(a), then sections 1608(a)(3) and (b)(3) are nullified.15 
  
F.2d 830, 834 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that mail is a valid method of service under the 
Hague Convention); Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 808–09 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding 
that mail is a valid method of service under the Hague Convention). 
 10. Bankston, 889 F.2d at 173–74; Nuovo Pignone, SpA, 310 F.3d at 384–85. 
 11. Ackermann, 788 F.2d at 839; Brockmeyer, 383 F.3d at 802–03. 
 12. Hague Service Convention, supra note 5, arts. 2, 5. 
 13. Patterns and suggestions relating to individual countries’ approaches to 
accepting service of process have been determined from the knowledge and experience of 
Aaron Lukken, Esq., who provides litigation support in serving process abroad, 
compelling evidence in foreign countries, and enforcing judgments overseas. Such 
patterns and suggestions are presented in the Appendix to this Article. 
 14. Section 1608(a) establishes the following hierarchy of steps to achieve 
service: (1) if there is a special arrangement in place, serve according to the arrangement; 
(2) if there is no special arrangement, serve according to an applicable treaty; (3) if 
service cannot be effected according to a treaty or if there is no treaty, then resort to mail, 
assuming the forum court’s rules apply; (4) and finally, if after all of the above, service 
cannot be effected, then one must go through the State Department for service to be 
effected. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(1)–(4). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b)(3) (listing additional 
alternatives pertaining to agencies and instrumentalities of foreign states). See discussion 
infra Part III (regarding the definition of “foreign state” under the Act). 
 15. Specifically when a foreign government objects to Article 10(a) of the Hague 
Service Convention, mail service becomes invalid, and therefore, sections 1608(a)(3) and 
(b)(3) of the FSIA are negated. See Hague Service Convention, supra note 5, art. 10 
(providing if “the State of destination does not object, the present Convention shall not 
interfere with – a) the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to 
persons abroad”) (emphasis added). Hague channels are mandatory and exclusive under 
Schlunk. 486 U.S. at 699, 706–07. Simply, if the destination state objects to Article 10(a) 
of the Convention, then Article 10(a) is not applicable as to that country. 
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Schlunk applies even in FSIA cases, as alluded to in sections 
1608(a)(2) and (b)(2).16 This is absolutely critical with regard to mail “in 
accordance with an applicable international convention on service of 
judicial documents”17 and negates the validity of mail service under 
sections 1608(a)(3) and (b)(3) if the target country objects to Article 
10(a).18 Regardless of the legal validity of mail service, the method 
presents massive factual problems; for example, a plaintiff left unable to 
prove delivery without a return receipt. Thus, factual problems presented 
upon serving a foreign defendant make the legal hurdles over which 
United States business entities have to jump only higher as they litigate 
independent issues under the FSIA.  
C.  The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act  
The FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1602, et seq., governs all litigation against 
“foreign states,” which include foreign states’ political subdivisions, 
agencies, or instrumentalities.19 The Act is the exclusive basis for 
obtaining jurisdiction over these entities in the United States20 and 
“contains a comprehensive set of legal standards governing claims of 
immunity in every civil action against a foreign state or its political 
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities.”21 
Because the Act does not distinguish “between the ‘state’ and its 
‘government,’” it applies whether the named defendant is any of the 
following: “China, the People’s Republic of China, the Government of 
China, or one of its integral governmental components (such as the 
National People’s Congress, the People’s Liberation Army, or the 
Ministry of State Security).”22 Additionally, the Act raises a distinction 
by expressly defining “foreign state” to include the foreign state’s 
  
 16. See supra text accompanying notes 14–15. 
 17. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(2). 
 18. Hague Service Convention, supra note 5, art. 10(a); see supra text 
accompanying notes 14–15. 
 19. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983). See 
discussion infra Part III. 
 20. Argentine Rep. v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989). 
 21. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488. 
 22. David P. Stewart, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: A Guide for 
Judges, FED. JUD. CENTER, 6 (2013), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ 
fsiaguide2013.pdf/$file/fsiaguide2013.pdf. 
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political subdivisions or its agencies or instrumentalities.23 Political 
subdivisions are typically observed as “the state (or government).”24 This 
means, for example, that suits against China’s provinces, autonomous 
regions, or municipalities would be equated to a suit against the state or 
government.25 Yet, when a defendant is instead “an ‘agency or 
instrumentality’ (such as the National Bauxite Trading Company of 
China),” pertinent rules under the Act apply, as opposed to those in a 
case involving the foreign sovereign itself or its political subdivisions.26 
Such rules applying to “agencies and instrumentalities,” as distinguished 
from foreign sovereigns, have legal ramifications including those 
involved with service as well as “venue, punitive damages, attachment, 
and execution.”27 
Generally, a “foreign state” enjoys immunity from the jurisdiction of 
United States federal and state courts unless a plaintiff can prove that one 
of the distinct exceptions specified in the FSIA applies.28 Two of those 
exceptions discussed here include actions where “the foreign state has 
explicitly or impliedly waived immunity” under section 1605(a)(1) and 
actions where the foreign state has carried on commercial activities in the 
United States or its commercial activities have caused a direct effect in 
the United States under section 1605(a)(2).29 
In recent years, litigation relating to the FSIA has increased 
considerably given advancements in technology and globalization, which 
together, increase the amount of international business dealings and open 
the door for foreign state-owned enterprises to argue for immunity 
relating to those dealings in United States courts.30 In particular, 
  
 23. Id. at 7. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 6–7. 
 27. Id. at 7. 
 28. 28 U.S.C. § 1604; Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488. 
 29. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488. “The Act also contains exceptions for certain 
actions ‘in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue,’ § 
1605(a)(3); actions involving rights in real estate and in inherited and gift property 
located in the United States, § 1605(a)(4); actions for certain noncommercial torts within 
the United States, § 1605(a)(5); certain actions involving maritime liens, §1605(b); and 
certain counterclaims, § 1607.” Id. at 489 n. 11. 
 30. See Crowell & Moring LLP, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: 2012 
Year in Review, 20 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 565, 566 (2014). 
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circumstances attributable to the increase in FSIA litigation are the 
“[e]ver increasing globalization of business and the increased use of 
international arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism (with 
enforcement left to domestic courts)[, which] have resulted in an increase 
in purely commercial litigation involving foreign states.”31 Furthermore, 
much of the litigation revolves around the FSIA’s commercial activity 
exception, which in turn, affects contracts entered into between United 
States business entities and foreign sovereigns and business entities 
owned by such sovereigns. Further concerns emanate from the fact that, 
while our world continues to become smaller, state-owned enterprises are 
increasing and becoming players in the global marketplace, and they use 
the FSIA as a shield of protection for their actions.32 
In fact, foreign sovereigns have exploited the FSIA and its gateway to 
jurisdictional immunity to avoid liability.33 From the time the FSIA was 
enacted in the seventies, “foreign sovereigns have increasingly utilized 
discrete corporate structures to conduct their commercial affairs.”34 
Resultantly, foreign sovereigns’ enterprises enjoy the FSIA’s 
“presumption of immunity,” notwithstanding their commercial 
characteristics and legally distinct personalities.35 Thus, “[b]y attaching 
the presumption of immunity to their commercial corporations, foreign 
sovereigns may extend sovereign immunity to their commercial 
counterparts while limiting their liability for commercial acts.”36 Because 
plaintiffs “are often unaware that the corporation with whom they are 
contracting may be entitled to immunity,” these plaintiffs are 
“disadvantaged.”37  
To avoid being a “disadvantaged plaintiff,” this Article encourages 
United States business entities to be educated on (1) the Act; (2) the 
nature of foreign business entities with whom they are dealing; and (3) 
provisions, such as waiver provisions, to be included in agreements with 
  
 31. Id. 
 32. See Matthew Engellenner, The Disadvantaged Plaintiff: Is it Time to Revisit 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?, 17 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 375, 375–
76 (2012). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 375. 
 35. Id. at 375–76. 
 36. Id. at 376. 
 37. Id. at 398. 
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such foreign entities as state-owned enterprises. This Article 
recommends mindful attention to the Act and its provisions, along with 
the nature of foreign contracting parties in a transaction, to avoid 
excessively exhausting resources in order to jump over time-consuming 
and financially draining legal hurdles. To be clear, this Article is not 
written to discourage business relationships with companies owned by 
foreign governments. Rather, the intention is to encourage United States 
companies to enter into such relationships with full knowledge of what is 
involved in resolving any disputes that may arise between the parties 
through litigation. 
With regard to agreements reached between United States business 
entities and state-owned enterprises and service, the “special 
arrangement” clauses of sections 1608(a)(1) and (b)(1) of the Act offer 
the most practical way to prevent the need to serve according to the 
Hague Service Convention.38 Truly, whether contracting with foreign 
sovereigns, private entities, or individuals, parties should always include 
a designated agent or manner of service in the initial contract.39 This 
could be as simple as the designation of an agent for service or a waiver 
of the traditional prohibition on serving diplomats within the United 
States. This Article further encourages United States business entities to 
aggressively negotiate for explicit waivers to be executed by the foreign 
sovereigns and foreign states in mutual agreements in order to alleviate 
the daunting time and expense associated with litigation under the FSIA. 
 
  
 38. Under section 1608(a)(1) of the FSIA, if a plaintiff serves according to the 
terms of a special arrangement, more than likely, the plaintiff is serving in the United 
States, rendering a situation where adherence to the Hague Service Convention is 
unnecessary. See 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(1) (applying to “a foreign state or political 
subdivision of a foreign state”); 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(1) (applying to “an agency or 
instrumentality of a foreign state”); see also supra text accompanying notes 14–15 
(regarding the hierarchy depicted in section 1608(a)). 
 39. See supra text accompanying note 13. If a United States business entity 
designates an agent or manner in its contracts, then those contracts will necessarily 
implicate FSIA sections 1608(a)(1) and (b)(1) and not the later steps in the hierarchy 
depicted under section 1608(a). See supra text accompanying notes 13–14. 
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I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FSIA 
Review of the origin of foreign sovereign immunity as a doctrine 
creates the framework in which the FSIA is viewed today. Foreign 
sovereign immunity evolved through common law before the FSIA’s 
enactment in 1976.40 In fact, for more than two hundred years, foreign 
sovereigns were granted absolute and complete immunity from suits in 
the United States.41 Dating back to 1812, in Schooner v. McFaddon, 
Justice John Marshall of the United States Supreme Court held that the 
United States lacked jurisdiction over an armed French warship docked 
in Philadelphia.42 This decision, known as the “Schooner Exchange” 
decision, became recognized as extending virtually absolute immunity to 
foreign sovereigns as “a matter of grace and comity on the part of the 
United States, and not a restriction imposed by the Constitution.”43 
Accordingly, decisions as to whether to exercise jurisdiction in 
actions against foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities were 
deferred to the Executive Branch.44 Prior to 1952, “the Executive Branch 
followed a policy of requesting immunity in all actions against friendly 
sovereigns.”45 But sentiments on this policy soon changed. 
Meanwhile, for various reasons[,] governments were increasingly 
becoming engaged in state-trading and various commercial activities. 
Lawyers, scholars and private parties urged that the complete immunity 
of states engaged in commercial activities was not required by 
international law and was undesirable because absolute immunity (even 
for friendly nations) deprived private parties that dealt with state 
enterprises of judicial remedies and gave state businesses an unfair 
competitive advantage.46 
  
 40. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 311 (2010). 
 41. Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 145–47 (1812). 
 42. Id. at 147. 
 43. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486.  
 44. Id. 
 45. Rep. of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 689 (2004). 
 46. Tom McNamara, A Primer on Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, DAVIS 
GRAHAM & STUBBS LLP (July 26, 2006), http://www.dgslaw.com/images/materials/ 
TMCN_PrimerForeignSovereignImmunity.pdf. 
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In response to this concern, in 1952, the United States Department of 
State adopted a restrictive theory of sovereign immunity by issuing what 
came to be known as the “Tate Letter.”47 The Tate Letter reflects the 
“view that customary international law had evolved to permit 
adjudication of disputes arising from a state’s commercial activities (acta 
jure gestionis) while preserving immunity for sovereign or ‘public’ acts 
(acta jure imperii).”48 This restrictive theory fundamentally expresses 
“that foreign sovereigns should not enjoy immunity for their commercial 
acts.”49 
However, the application of the restrictive theory still proved 
troublesome. The Executive Branch, acting through the State 
Department, continued to be initially responsible for deciding questions 
of sovereign immunity and the courts abided by “‘suggestions of 
immunity’” from the State Department.50 Another complication arose 
because foreign nations had not always made requests to the State 
Department for immunity.51 Rather, in such cases, responsibility fell to 
the courts, which in turn, would refer to prior State Department decisions 
to determine whether immunity existed.52 This resulted in “sovereign 
immunity determinations” being made by two different branches, 
  
 47. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486–87 (citing Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal 
Adviser, Department of State, to Acting Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 
1952), reprinted in 26 DEPT. OF STATE BULL. 984–85 (1952), and in Alfred Dunhill of 
London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711–15 (1976) (Appendix 2 to opinion of White, 
J.)). The restrictive theory applied to the FSIA’s scope gives immunity to a foreign state 
for claims relating to that foreign state’s public or sovereign acts, but claims relating to a 
foreign state’s commercial or private acts will subject that foreign state to a United States 
court’s jurisdiction. Joshua Burress, Sovereign Disobedience: The Role of U.S. Courts in 
Curtailing the Proliferation of Sovereign Default, 25 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 269, 
284 (2015); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7 (1976) (The FSIA “would codify the 
so-called ‘restrictive’ principle of sovereign immunity, as presently recognized in 
international law.”). 
 48. Stewart, supra note 22, at 5. For more background on customary international 
law, see generally LORI FISLER DAMROSCH & SEAN D. MURPHY, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
CASES AND MATERIALS 1, 59–61 (6th ed. 2014). 
 49. Phillip Riblett, A Legal Regime for State-Owned Companies in the Modern 
Era, 18 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 5 (2008). 
 50. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
2016] The FSIA's Crippling Effect 635 
Judicial and Executive, and the standards used were “neither clear nor 
uniformly applied.”53 
II.  OVERVIEW OF THE ACT TODAY  
Consequently, in 1976, twenty-four years after the issuance of the 
Tate Letter, Congress passed the FSIA.54 The Act is a comprehensive 
statute providing legal standards that govern claims made for immunity 
in all civil actions against “a foreign state or its political subdivisions, 
agencies or instrumentalities.”55 The FSIA “‘codifie[d], as a matter of 
federal law, the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity,’ . . . and 
transfer[red] primary responsibility for immunity determinations from 
the Executive to the Judicial Branch.”56 The Act is “the sole basis for 
obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in [United States Courts].”57 
III.  FOREIGN STATES: A DEFINITION 
State-owned enterprises continuously request and obtain immunity via 
corporate structure and ownership because the FSIA’s protection of 
immunity applies, not only to foreign sovereigns themselves, but also to 
their “foreign states,” which include their political subdivisions, agencies 
and instrumentalities.58 An agency or instrumentality of a foreign state is 
defined as any entity, 
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and 
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, 
or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a 
foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and 
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined 
in section 1332(c) and (e) of this title [(28 U.S.C. §1332(c), (e))] nor 
created under the laws of any third country.59 
  
 53. Id. at 488. 
 54. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq.; Riblett, supra note 49, at 3 (noting 
that the FSIA was enacted in 1976). 
 55. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 1. 
 56. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 691 (quoting Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488). 
 57. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. at 439. 
 58. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a); see also Stewart, supra note 22, at 6. 
 59. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b). 
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Accordingly, a state-owned enterprise, such as a corporation, may enjoy 
the immunity protection of its foreign sovereign if the foreign state owns 
a majority of the corporation’s shares at the time the complaint is filed 
and holds its shares directly, rather than through an intermediate entity.60 
Therefore, United States business entities and their legal departments 
need to know and understand with whom those business entities engage 
in business—especially in light of the increasing number of state-owned 
enterprises.  
Practically speaking, United States business entities ought to consider, 
keeping in mind potential FSIA claims, the (sometimes undetected) 
power of state-owned entities being represented on the other side of the 
negotiation table considering that “state-owned enterprises are among the 
largest and fastest expanding multinational companies.”61 One recent 
study found “that more than 10% of the world’s largest firms are state-
owned (204 firms),” coming from thirty-seven countries whose joint 
sales grew to $3.6 trillion in 2011 alone.62 These sales are “equivalent to 
6% of world GDP [(Gross Domestic Product)], exceeding the GDPs of 
countries such as Germany, France or the UK.”63 The top five countries 
with the highest state-owned enterprises among their top firms include 
“China (96%), the United Arab Emirates (88%), Russia (81%), Indonesia 
(69%), and Malaysia (68%).”64 Furthermore, “[i]n light of globalization 
and progressive government structure, today’s marketplaces are 
increasingly populated by state-owned corporations engaged in 
commercial conduct with private parties in a way Congress could have 
never anticipated [when the FSIA was enacted].”65 
Yet, under the Act, these state-owned enterprises, which are 
fundamentally commercial in nature, enjoy a presumption of immunity 
under the FSIA unless a plaintiff can establish an exception to immunity 
applies.66 These exceptions can, at times, be burdensome to establish.67 
  
 60. Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 477–78, 481 (2003). 
 61. Max Büge et al., State-Owned Enterprises in the Global Economy: Reasons 
for Concern?, VOXEU.ORG (May 2, 2013), www.voxeu.org/article/state-owned-
enterprises-global-economy-reason-concern. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Engellenner, supra note 32, at 405.  
 66. Id. at 397–98, 405–06. 
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Another factor to consider regarding litigation between United States 
business entities and state-owned enterprises, is the latter’s lack in 
legitimacy when denying that an exception applies. For instance, the 
state-owned enterprise may argue foreign sovereign immunity even 
though its activities are inherently commercial.68 In fact, any mandated 
sanctions for a false or inflated claim of foreign sovereign immunity are 
seemingly void, regardless of the hardship that is placed on the plaintiff 
in proving an exception.69 This may be because the court must first 
determine the issue of subject matter jurisdiction before the case can 
proceed on its merits.70 Although, the case law is not fully developed 
with respect to imposing sanctions for unsupported or illegitimate 
arguments responding to the application of an exception under the FSIA, 
courts have imposed discovery sanctions in FSIA cases.71 While 
  
 67. Id. at 399 (“With prior knowledge that their business counterpart may qualify 
for immunity, a party could proactively protect themselves by securing waivers of 
immunity in their contracts or generally ensuring that the transaction satisfies one of the 
FSIA exceptions. Often, plaintiffs only come to learn of their counterpart’s sovereign 
identity after litigation has already commenced, constituting unfair surprise.”). 
 68. Advice relating to the practical impacts brought on by the cost of time and 
strategic, procedural maneuvering under FSIA litigation has been determined by the 
knowledge and experience of Victoria Valentine, Esq., who has represented United States 
business entities against foreign state-owned enterprises in her practice. See also Order 
Re-Opening Case and Issuing Scheduling Order, Global Technology Inc. v. Yubei Power 
Steering Syst. Co., 2 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (demonstrating that years can pass before the 
courts render a final adjudication on the legitimacy of a foreign sovereign or foreign 
state’s jurisdictional defense under the FSIA. This is due to the shield that the 
presumption of immunity under the currently FSIA supplies and the automatic right to 
appeal as discussed in this Article). 
 69. See supra text accompanying note 68 (providing that advice relating to the 
practical impacts brought on by the cost of time and strategic, procedural maneuvering 
under FSIA litigation has been determined by the knowledge and experience of Victoria 
Valentine, Esq.). 
 70. Gould, 853 F.2d at 450–51. 
 71. See FG Hemisphere Assocs. v. Dem. Rep. Congo, 637 F.3d 373, 379–80 
(D.C. Cir. 2011); Servaas Inc. v. Rep. of Iraq, No. 09 Civ. 1862(RMB), 2014 WL 
279507, at 11–12 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2014). See also Stewart, supra note 22, at 73 
(“Whether sanctions can be imposed for failure to comply with a discovery order has 
been contested. Recently, in FG Hemisphere Associates, LLC. v. Democratic Republic of 
Congo, the D.C. Circuit held that contempt sanctions could in fact be imposed on a 
foreign sovereign for failure to respond to court-ordered discovery in an action to enforce 
an arbitral award.”). See id. n.209 (“In Autotech Technologies v. Integral Research & 
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Congress never intended to limit the inherent power of the courts to enter 
contempt orders, there is, however, debate over whether the imposition 
of sanctions for discovery abuses is even authorized.72 Nevertheless, 
because the commercial activity exception will continue to be further 
litigated, the future may present opportunities for courts to sanction 
parties or firms for unsupported legal arguments in addition to discovery 
violations. 
Currently, the state-owned enterprises enjoy the significant advantage 
of the initial presumption of immunity.73 Moreover, just as the Tate 
Letter reflected the view that international law evolved to allow 
adjudication of disputes relating to sovereigns’ commercial activity,74 
this Article finds that the FSIA should be revisited because of the 
political and economic changes since its enactment.75 
IV.  EXCEPTIONS TO IMMUNITY UNDER THE FSIA 
Of the nine distinct exceptions to the presumption of immunity,76 only 
the waiver and commercial activity exceptions will be discussed as the 
presumption may apply to United States business entities engaging in 
business with foreign sovereigns and foreign states as state-owned 
enterprises. 
  
Dev. Corp., 499 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2007), the court found no inherent limitation on the 
contempt power in the [FSIA] itself.”). 
 72. Compare FG Hemisphere Assocs., 637 F.3d at 378–79 (pointing out that 
Congress never intended to limit the inherent power of the courts to enter contempt 
orders), with Af-Cap, Inc. v. Rep. of Congo, 462 F.3d 417, 428–29 (5th Cir. 2006) 
(rejecting the idea that a contempt order can be entered against a party with immunity). 
 73. See Engellenner, supra note 32, at 398–402 (discussing disadvantages to 
plaintiff as a result of the presumption of immunity). 
 74. See supra notes 47–48. 
 75. See Engellenner, supra note 32, at 405–06. 
 76. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) involves the following six exceptions: (1) waiver, (2) 
commercial activity, (3) expropriations, (4) rights in certain kinds of property in the U.S., 
(5) non-commercial torts, and (6) enforcement of arbitral agreements and awards. 28 
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)–(6). This is not to be confused with section 1605A, which involves 
actions arising from certain state-sponsored terrorism. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2008). 
Sections 1605(b) through (d) involve maritime liens and preferred mortgages, and section 
1607 involves counterclaims. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(b)–(d), 1607. Collectively, the above 
constitute the nine categories of exception. 
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A.  Waiver 
Under section 1605(a)(1),  
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the court of 
the United States or of the States in any case in which the foreign state 
has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication, 
notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the foreign state 
may purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of the 
waiver.77 
Explicit waivers are generally construed narrowly by the courts in a 
foreign sovereign’s favor78 where “[a] foreign sovereign will not be 
found to have waived its immunity unless it has clearly and 
unambiguously done so.”79 Nevertheless, a contract clause irrevocably 
designating a United States forum for resolution of disputes has been 
held to be an explicit waiver of jurisdictional immunity.80 In Themis 
Capital, LLC v. Democratic Republic of Congo, the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York found an explicit 
waiver where the agreement provided that the Republic of Zaire,  
[I]rrevocably submits to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the High 
Court of Justice in London and any New York State or United States 
Federal Court . . . . [And the Parties] agree that a final judgment in any 
such action or proceeding shall be conclusive and may be enforced in 
other jurisdictions by suit on the judgment or in any other manner 
provided by law.81  
While an explicit waiver must be a “clear, complete, unambiguous, and 
unmistakable manifestation of the [foreign] sovereign’s [or foreign 
state’s] intent to waive . . . immunity,”82 it need not contain a reference to 
  
 77. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1). 
 78. World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Rep. of Kaz., 296 F.3d 1154, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 
2002). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Themis Capital, LLC v. Dem. Rep. Congo, 881 F. Supp. 2d 508, 516–17 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 81. Id. 
 82. World Wide Minerals, Ltd., 296 F.3d at 1162 (quoting Aquamar S.A. v. Del 
Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 179 F.3d 1279, 1292 (11th Cir. 1999)). 
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the United States or a specific jurisdiction within the United States as 
long as the waiver is explicit.83 
An implicit waiver, which is also narrowly construed by the courts, 
may occur only in one of the following three circumstances: “‘(1) a 
foreign state agrees to arbitration in another country; (2) the foreign state 
agrees that the contract is governed by the laws of a particular country; 
[and] (3) the state files a responsive pleading without raising the 
immunity defense.’”84 Implicit waivers have been found where a contract 
specifies the laws of the jurisdiction within the United States that 
governs. An example of this language is, it “‘shall be governed by and 
construed in accordance with the laws of the District of Columbia.’”85 
Additionally, as long as the contract contemplates the adjudication of the 
issues by a United States court, an implicit waiver exists even if the 
governing law is not explicitly identified.86 
An implicit waiver has been found where a lease between a San 
Francisco landlord and the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Consulate 
General of Nigeria contained a provision stating, “[i]n the event that any 
action shall be commenced by either party hereto arising out of, or 
concerning this lease . . . the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover 
attorney’s fees fixed by the court.”87 Even though the lease did not 
specifically state that the laws of a jurisdiction within the United States 
were to govern, the reviewing court found that there may have been a 
“[w]aiver by contract.”88 Therefore, “[w]aiver by contract is premised on 
  
 83. Capital Ventures Int’l v. Rep. of Arg., 552 F.3d 289, 293–94 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(“‘[T]o the extent that the Republic [of Argentina] has or hereafter may acquire any 
immunity (sovereign or otherwise) from jurisdiction of any court or from any legal 
process . . . the Republic hereby irrevocably waives such immunity . . . .’”). 
 84. Af-Cap, Inc., 462 F.3d at 426 (quoting Rodriguez v. Transnave, Inc., 8 F.3d 
284, 287 (5th Cir. 1993)); see also Joseph v. Office of the Consulate Gen. of Nigeria, 830 
F.2d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 1987); Presidential Comm’n on Good Gov’t v. U.S. Dist. Court 
for the Dist. of Haw. (In re Rep. of the Phil.), 309 F.3d 1143, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002); H.R. 
REP. NO. 94-1487, at 18. 
 85. Joseph, 830 F.2d at 1022 (quoting Marlow v. Argentine Naval Comm’ns, 604 
F. Supp. 703, 708 (D.D.C. 1985)). 
 86. 830 F.2d at 1022–23.  
 87. Id. at 1022. 
 88. Id. 
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an agreement by the parties that the United States courts may become 
involved in disputes arising pursuant to the contract.”89  
However, implicit waivers have not been found where the “contract 
specifies that the laws of a jurisdiction outside of the United States are to 
govern.”90 For example, a forum selection clause providing that “‘[t]he 
Courts in India and the [United States] . . . only shall have jurisdiction’” 
has been insufficient to waive immunity.91 Certainly, “by securing 
waivers of immunity” in their agreements, which should be carefully 
drafted, plaintiffs may protect themselves from the defense of sovereign 
immunity.92 
Therefore, to prevent jurisdictional disputes, representatives of United 
States business entities are advised to include specific contract language, 
in addition to an explicit waiver, in agreements with foreign sovereigns 
and state-owned entities. Suggested specific contract language includes a 
clause by which the foreign sovereign or foreign state, as a party to the 
contract, recognizes and acknowledges that it is engaging in a 
commercial activity and is thus subject to suit in the United States. A 
choice of law clause is another recommended clause. Such a clause is 
important because foreign sovereigns or foreign states may insist that 
their own law, rather than forum law, governs the contract.93 Although 
the forum court can make its own determination as to the applicable law, 
the choice of law by the parties negates the need for such analysis.94 
  
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 1022. 
 91. Poddar v. State Bank of India, 235 F.R.D. 592, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). This 
2006 case appears to conflict with Themis Capital, LLC v. Democratic Republic of 
Congo, which found an explicit waiver even though the agreement provided that both 
courts of London and New York had jurisdiction. 881 F. Supp. at 516, 532. 
 92. See Engellenner, supra note 32, at 399; Riblett, supra note 49, at 31. 
 93. See supra text accompanying notes 13, 68 (providing that patterns among 
individual countries’ approaches to accepting service of process have been determined 
from the knowledge and experience of Aaron Lukken, Esq., and advice relating to the 
practical impacts brought on by the cost of time and strategic, procedural maneuvering 
under FSIA litigation has been determined by the knowledge and experience of Victoria 
Valentine, Esq.). 
 94. See supra text accompanying notes 13, 68 (providing that patterns among 
individual countries’ approaches to accepting service of process have been determined 
from the knowledge and experience of Aaron Lukken, Esq., and advice relating to the 
practical impacts brought on by the cost of time and strategic, procedural maneuvering 
 
642 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 24.3 
Moreover, the inclusion of a forum selection clause, referred to 
internationally as a choice of court clause,95 as well as a choice of 
language clause in the event that a contract is drafted in more than one 
language, may also negate a host of objections on the part of the foreign 
sovereign or foreign state—most notably, jurisdiction.  
In addition to these suggested contractual provisions, the operative 
language of a contract is critical and should be determined in advance.96 
Overall, in the business sector, it is suggested that by procuring specific 
contractual clauses, including an explicit waiver, the parties may be able 
to bypass the pitfalls, expense, and uncertainty related to jurisdictional 
issues pursuant to the FSIA. 
B.  Commercial Acts 
The commercial activity exception is another significant exception 
often used by foreign sovereigns, and particularly, state-owned 
enterprises. Although the intricacies of state-owned enterprises claiming 
immunity from litigation under the FSIA stem from a relationship that is 
typically commercial in nature,97 the “commercial activity” actualized 
and that warrants the exception to immunity requires specific criteria to 
be met.  
First, “‘[c]ommercial activity’ means either a regular course of 
commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act.”98 
Second, while most state-owned enterprises are engaged in inherently 
commercial activity, a “plaintiff must [nevertheless] demonstrate a nexus 
between the foreign state’s commercial acts, the plaintiff’s claim, and the 
  
under FSIA litigation has been determined by the knowledge and experience of Victoria 
Valentine, Esq.). 
 95. See Walter W. Heiser, The Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements: The Impact on Forum Non Conveniens, Transfer of Venue, Removal, and 
Recognition of Judgments in United States Courts, U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1013, 1014 (2010). 
 96. See supra text accompanying notes 13, 68 (providing that patterns among 
individual countries’ approaches to accepting service of process have been determined 
from the knowledge and experience of Aaron Lukken, Esq., and advice relating to the 
practical impacts brought on by the cost of time and strategic, procedural maneuvering 
under FSIA litigation has been determined by the knowledge and experience of Victoria 
Valentine, Esq.). 
 97. See discussion supra pp. 636-38. 
 98. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d). 
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United States.”99 Section 1605(a)(2) provides three prongs upon which a 
plaintiff’s claim must be based: 
• “[A] commercial activity carried on in the United States by . . . [a] 
foreign state;” 
• “[A]n act[ion] performed in the United States in connection with a 
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or” 
• “[A]n act[ion] outside . . . of the United States in connection with 
commercial activity of a foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a 
direct effect in the United States.”100  
If a plaintiff demonstrates any of these prongs—which functionally 
define “commercial activity” under the Act—”a foreign state is not 
immune from suit in any case.”101 However, these prongs as well as the 
developed definition of “commercial activity” have posed challenges 
given their ambiguities.102 For instance, in Republic of Argentina v. 
Weltover, Inc., the United States Supreme Court found “commercial” in 
section 1603(d) to be undefined, but limited in scope under the restrictive 
theory encompassing the Act.103  
In Weltover, the Court held an activity is “commercial” when the 
foreign sovereign or foreign state104 acts as “a private player” within the 
market: when the activity’s nature is the “type . . . by which a private 
party engages in ‘trade and traffic or commerce.’”105 An example is a 
sales contract to acquire goods to which an ordinary individual and a 
foreign state-owned enterprise can each be party.106 Additionally, the 
Court held that Argentina’s activity as a party, issuing bonds that 
defaulted, was a commercial activity.107  
  
 99. Riblett, supra note 49, at 32.  
 100. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). 
 101. Rep. of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 611 (1992). 
 102. ANDREW M. VOLLMER ET AL., A.B.A. SEC. INT’L L. & PRAC., REPORT ON THE 
U.S. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT 79–80 (2001), available at 
http://famguardian.org/subjects/freedom/Sovereignty/RptForeignSovImmAct-ABA.pdf. 
 103. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 612–13; see supra text accompanying note 47 
(regarding the restrictive theory). 
 104. DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 48, at 845. 
 105. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 270 (6th ed. 
1990)). 
 106. Id. at 614–15. 
 107. Id. at 617. 
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Recently, in Global Technology, Inc. v. Yubei (XinXiang) Power 
Steering System. Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit affirmatively held that, after a plaintiff sustains its burden of 
production establishing that an exception under the Act applies (e.g., the 
foreign state engaged in commercial activity), the burden of persuasion 
shifts to the foreign state to demonstrate that its actions do not satisfy an 
exception.108 Therefore, “‘[t]he party claiming immunity under FSIA 
retains the burden of persuasion throughout this process.’”109 The Sixth 
Circuit found the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the 
defendant to show why “its actions are not the sort of private commercial 
activities that a private corporation would perform in the competitive 
marketplace.”110 In its holding, the Sixth Circuit further emphasized the 
grounds warranting the commercial activity exception’s application 
pronounced in Weltover: where the defendant’s foreign business entity is 
acting as a “corporate competitor” rather than a “governmental 
regulator.”111  
Global Technology demonstrates the time-consuming back and forth 
of burden shifting required under the FSIA to determine whether an 
action constitutes “commercial activity.”112 This strenuous mandatory 
determination of litigating whether a foreign sovereign’s or foreign 
state’s activity was legally “commercial,” even when the actions are 
undeniably commercial, is often accompanied by the halting of discovery 
during the appeal process.113 Delay, together with the prolonged and 
increased cost of litigation, has a chilling effect on pursuing a plaintiff’s 
legal rights.  
Furthermore, the legislative history of the FSIA concerning the 
commercial activity exception demonstrates that Congress did not have 
an interest in proclaiming which activities would be commercial in 
nature in the text of the Act.114 Specifically, House Report No. 94-1487 
(regarding enacted House Bill 11315 as the FSIA) provided that courts 
would have great “latitude” in establishing the contours of commercial 
  
 108. 807 F.3d 806, 811 (6th Cir. 2015).  
 109. Id. (quoting O’Bryan v. Holy See, 556 F.3d 361, 376 (6th Cir. 2009)). 
 110. Id. at 814–15. 
 111. Id. at 815. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See discussion infra pp. 24–26. 
 114. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 16. 
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activity because it “seemed unwise to attempt an excessively precise 
definition of this term.”115 
However, the legislative history to the FSIA does reveal that Congress 
contemplated “examples of conduct that would qualify as commercial for 
purposes of the FSIA, and of claims that would be sufficiently ‘based 
upon’ or ‘in connection with’ commercial activity to fall within Section 
1605(a)(2).”116 With regard to the former, the legislative history lends the 
following as examples to be included as commercial activity: 
• “‘[T]he carrying on of a commercial enterprise such as a 
mineral extraction company, an airline or a state trading 
corporation[]’;” 
• “‘[A] contract by a foreign government to buy provisions or 
equipment for its armed forces or to construct a government    
 building. . . .’;” 
• “A contract to make repairs on an embassy building; . . .” 
• “‘[S]ale of a service or a product. . . .’;” 
• “‘[L]easing of property. . . .’;” 
• “‘[B]orrowing of money. . . .’;” 
• “‘[E]mployment or engagement of laborers, clerical staff or public 
relations or marketing agents. . . .’;” [and] 
• “‘[I]nvestment in a security [of a United States corporation]. . . .’”117  
  
 115. Id. 
 116. George K. Foster, When Commercial Meets Sovereign: A New Paradigm for 
Applying the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in Crossover Cases, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 
361, 375 (2014). 
 117. Id. at 375 (2014) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 16). The House of 
Representatives pointed out and passed a recent distinction concerning what is not 
actually commercial activity, and the House also “clarif[ied] the exception to foreign 
sovereign immunity set forth in section 1605(a)(3),” which also regards commercial 
activity. Foreign Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional Immunity Clarification Act, H.R. 
4292, 113th Cong. (2014); Foreign Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional Immunity 
Clarification Act, H.R. 889, 114th Cong. (2015). Bill 113 H.R. 4292—and later version 
114 H.R. 889—discussed the Foreign Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional Immunity 
Clarification Act. H.R. 4292; H.R. 889. These Bills provide that foreign states importing 
artworks for temporary expedition in the United States are not conducting commercial 
activity under the FSIA. H.R. 4292 § 2(a); H.R. 889 § 2(a). However, when international 
law violations of property rights over such artworks are claimed against the Government 
of Germany or a European government affiliated with the Government of Germany 
during the “covered period” of “January 30, 1933 [to] . . . May 8, 1945,” a United States 
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With regard to the latter, cases showing a nexus connection based upon 
“commercial transactions performed in whole or in part in the United 
States[,]” as determined by a court,118 listed were the following:  
• “[I]mport-export transactions involving sales to, or purchases from, 
concerns in the United States”;119 
• “[B]usiness torts occurring in the United States”;120 and 
• “[A]n indebtedness incurred by a foreign state which negotiates or 
executes a loan agreement in the United States, or which receives 
financing from a private or public lending institution located in the 
United States.”121 
Considering the above nuances for an activity to be “commercial” 
under the Act and those that establish the mandatory nexus demonstrated 
by the three prongs in section 1605(a)(2) between the plaintiff’s claim 
and the United States and the foreign state’s acts, there is a 
“‘considerably greater’ [burden upon the plaintiff] than what would 
apply in the context of a typical company.”122 Although, the purpose of 
such provisions in the commercial activity exception is to provide a 
foundation to justify the applicability of United States law and the FSIA 
in an action,123 “[s]ection 1605(a)(2) is another example of how, due to 
the difficulty of establishing an applicable exception, the presumption of 
immunity is a significant advantage for [foreign state-owned 
enterprises].”124 This is emphasized by the unclear lines that dictate a 
court’s case-by-case determination of whether an activity is 
  
court is free to determine whether the activity was “commercial activity” under section 
1603(d) and to exercise jurisdiction over such foreign state under section 1605(a)(3). 
H.R. 4292 § 2(a); H.R. 889 § 2(a). These 2014 and 2015 Bills demonstrate the 
inconsistency and complication effecting the determination of what is “commercial” 
under the Act when such activity, done by a foreign state conducting an artwork 
expedition, can considerably satisfy the “private player” in the market place qualification 
for “commercial activity” that the Supreme Court set out in Weltover because a private 
individual can engage in the same activity. 
 118. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 17; VOLLMER ET AL., supra note 102, at 79.  
 119. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 17. 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id.  
 122. Riblett, supra note 49, at 33. 
 123. VOLLMER ET AL., supra note 102, at 81. 
 124. Riblett, supra note 49, at 33. 
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“commercial” to satisfy the exception to the presumption of immunity 
under the FSIA125 despite examples in the legislative history of the Act.  
Consequently, “‘[t]he requirement under the FSIA of a connection 
between the plaintiff’s cause of action and the commercial acts of the 
foreign sovereign [or foreign state, accompanied by distinctions 
complicating what constitutes commercial activity,] is a significant 
barrier to the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction in the United States 
Courts.’”126 While the commercial activity exception is laborious to 
prove, there is no confusion that there is a bright-line difference between 
nature and purpose of an activity. The Act clearly provides that “[t]he 
commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to 
the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather 
than by reference to its purpose.”127  
This seemingly mundane nuance between nature and purpose, 
however, can be a significant crutch to a foreign sovereign’s or state’s 
ability to garner the protection of the FSIA.128 And rightfully so as 
different governments may have different purposes for their actions, 
rendering the purpose an inappropriate measure. The Supreme Court of 
the United States unequivocally held the “question is not whether the 
foreign government is acting with a profit motive.”129 Therefore, despite 
the attempt to introduce and argue a sovereign’s motive with arguments 
based upon a sovereign’s subjective profit motive, or the lack thereof, the 
courts have swiftly rejected such measures.130 
  
 125. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 16; see also supra text accompanying note 117. 
 126. Riblett, supra at note 49, at 35 (quoting Stena Rederi, AB v. Comision de 
Contratos del Comite Ejecutivo General, 923 F.2d 380, 387 (5th Cir. 1991)). 
 127. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (2005).  
 128. See supra text accompanying note 68 (providing that advice relating to the 
practical impacts brought on by the cost of time and strategic, procedural maneuvering 
under FSIA litigation has been determined by the knowledge and experience of Victoria 
Valentine, Esq.). 
 129. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614. 
 130. See Beg v. Islamic Rep. of Pak., 353 F.3d 1323, 1327 n.1 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(“We decline to examine the government’s motives in determining what is commercial 
activity.”); see also, e.g., NML Capital, Ltd. v. Rep. of Arg., 680 F.3d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 
2012) (“The [sovereign’s] lack of a profit motive is simply irrelevant.”); Rush-
Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Med. Ctr. v. Hellenic Rep., 877 F.2d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(“Whether the obligation to provide . . . services arises from the relation of government to 
citizen, or employer to employee, or insurer to insured is simply irrelevant—the ‘basic 
exchange’ of money for health care services is the same in each context. We decline to 
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One could argue that with the globalization of commerce and the 
intentional infiltration of products that advance the commercial presence 
of a foreign state’s or, specifically, a state-owned enterprise’s position in 
the market place, the time has come to even the playing field and curb 
the protections of the FSIA. At the very least there are certainly instances 
of “commercial activity”—such as a state-owned enterprise becoming a 
private player in an American market—that should not enjoy the 
protections of the FSIA. Nor should these instances invoke the right to 
claim an illegitimate defense cloaked under the protections of the FSIA 
without compensating the plaintiff for the costs and expense of litigating 
a meritless FSIA defense.  
However, until Congress takes the necessary steps to protect its 
citizens from unscrupulous defenses or the ill-begotten, unintended 
advantages that the FSIA offers to foreign states and state-owned 
enterprises, the best protection is to seek specific contract provisions, 
including but not limited to an explicit waiver of any FSIA claim. It is 
further noted here that, under the Act, there is no express mention of 
sanction awards for claiming a defense of immunity regardless if such 
defense is legitimately used.131 
V.  APPEALS UNDER THE FSIA 
Fast-forwarding through litigation, even if a plaintiff survives a 
foreign state or state-owned enterprise’s motion to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, a defendant will likely appeal this interlocutory type 
order.132 Further, absent an implicit waiver including the filing of a 
responsive pleading without raising immunity as a defense,133 a 
  
focus exclusively, for purposes of determining immunity, on the purpose for which 
Greece happened to enter this particular transaction.”); Joseph, 830 F.2d at 1024 
(“[T]here is no indication that Congress intended the presence of a profit motive on the 
part of the sovereign to be a threshold requirement for applying the commercial activity 
exception.”). 
 131. See Af-Cap, Inc. 462 F.3d at 428–29. 
 132. See, e.g., Order Re-Opening Case and Issuing Scheduling Order, Global 
Tech., Inc. v. Yubei Power Steering Syst. Co., 2 (E.D. Mich. 2015); Global Tech. Inc., 
807 F.3d at 809–10. 
 133. See discussion supra pp. 640-41; see also supra text accompanying note 68 
(providing that advice relating to the practical impacts brought on by the cost of time and 
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defendant can conceivably hold its cards and wait to raise the issue 
because litigants can bring a motion challenging subject matter 
jurisdiction at any time during litigation.134 
Generally, a motion to dismiss, even one based on jurisdictional 
grounds, is not immediately reviewable.135 Under the FSIA, however, 
foreign states have an immediate right to appeal rulings denying claims 
of foreign sovereign immunity under the collateral order doctrine.136 This 
is “because ‘sovereign immunity’ is an immunity from trial, not just a 
defense to liability on the merits [and, therefore,] the denial of a claim of 
sovereign immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order 
doctrine as a final decision, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”137 
The majority of the Federal Circuits agree that, under the FSIA, there 
is an immediate right of appeal under the collateral order doctrine to 
prevent the need for parties to litigate claims over which the court lacks 
jurisdiction.138 Nonetheless, the appeals process, which stays the case, is 
another costly delay tactic, which may be utilized by the state-owned 
enterprises seeking immunity for their actions under the Act.139 In fact, a 
  
strategic, procedural maneuvering under FSIA litigation has been determined by the 
knowledge and experience of Victoria Valentine, Esq.). 
 134. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 
 135. Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 277 F.3d 811, 815 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 136. Gould, 853 F.2d at 451.  
 137. O’Bryan, 556 F.3d at 372 (quoting Keller, 277 F.3d at 815). For an 
explanation of the collateral order doctrine’s application to FSIA claims, see Gould, 853 
F.2d at 450–51 (internal citations omitted) (“A motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) 
questioning subject matter jurisdiction must be considered before other 
challenges since the court must find jurisdiction before determining the validity 
of a claim. Ordinarily, the ‘denial of a motion to dismiss, even when the motion 
is based on jurisdictional grounds, is not immediately reviewable.‘ However, a 
denial of foreign sovereign immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order 
doctrine as a final decision, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”).  
 138. See generally, e.g., Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 
2012); Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2010); Abi Jaoudi & Ajar 
Trading Corp. v. Cigna Worldwide Ins. Co., 391 F. App’x 173 (3d Cir. 2010); Hansen v. 
PT Bank Negara Indon. (Persero), TBK, 601 F.3d 1059 (10th Cir. 2010); La Reunion 
Aerienne v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 533 F.3d 837 (D.C. Cir. 2008); 
Filler v. Hanvit Bank, 378 F.3d 213 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 139. See supra text accompanying note 68 (providing that advice relating to the 
practical impacts brought on by the cost of time and strategic, procedural maneuvering 
under FSIA litigation has been determined by the knowledge and experience of Victoria 
Valentine, Esq.).  
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foreign sovereign or foreign state may take advantage of the appeals 
process on the immunity issue on more than one occasion.140 For 
example, if a district court finds that a foreign sovereign or foreign state 
does not have FSIA protection, that foreign sovereign or foreign state can 
immediately appeal the decision.141 In the event that a higher court 
remands the issue, it is conceivable that a state-owned enterprise could 
appeal the district court’s decision on remand again. Until a court of 
appeal affirms that there is no immunity, this situation is subject to 
uncertainty. 
The time involved in these appeals, which delays the litigation and 
discovery, is considerable. From June 2014 to June 2015, the median 
time from the filing of a Notice of Appeal to disposition averaged 8.4 
months in federal courts, which is delineated by federal circuit below.142  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 140. See supra text accompanying note 68 (providing that advice relating to the 
practical impacts brought on by the cost of time and strategic, procedural maneuvering 
under FSIA litigation has been determined by the knowledge and experience of Victoria 
Valentine, Esq.). 
 141. See, e.g., Order Re-Opening Case and Issuing Scheduling Order, Global 
Tech., Inc. v. Yubei Power Steering Syst. Co., 1–2 (E.D. Mich. 2015); Global Tech. Inc., 
807 F.3d at 809. See also O’Bryan, 556 F.3d at 372 (explaining that a “‘denial of a claim 
of sovereign immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine’”) 
(quoting Keller, 277 F.3d at 815). 
 142. To access the information included in the time lapse table designated by 
federal circuit court as well as the average median time nationally, see U.S. Courts of 
Appeals Federal Court Management Statistics (June 30, 2015), OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS tbl., http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/na/federal-court-management-
statistics/2015/06/30 (last visited March 22, 2016), then click “Download Data Table” 
and review the “Median Time from Filing Notice of Appeal to Disposition” row for the 
national total and for each Circuit. 
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Time Lapse Federal Circuit Court 
14 months D.C. Circuit 
12.7 months 1st Circuit 
10 months 2nd Circuit 
8.3 months 3rd Circuit 
5.3 months 4th Circuit 
9.2 months 5th Circuit 
8.8 months 6th Circuit 
7.2 months 7th Circuit 
6 months 8th Circuit 
12.8 months 9th Circuit 
7.8 months 10th Circuit 
7.3 months 11th Circuit 
 
Certainly, plaintiffs should be mindful of the time, which delays 
discovery and the litigation process itself, and the costs involved in an 
appeal when entering into business dealings with foreign business 
entities that could be subject to the FSIA. Again, when entering into a 
business relationship with foreign sovereigns or an entity classified as a 
foreign state under the Act, it is likely best to insist on an explicit waiver 
because it may potentially narrow the scope of the litigation and appeals 
to the actual, primary legal issues and not the FSIA issues. Consequently, 
litigation can be more streamlined and less costly for all parties involved. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article encourages United States business entities to educate 
themselves about the effects of the FSIA. According to the trends, the 
United States will continue to do business with state-owned enterprises. 
This Article recommends that individual business entities should include 
specific contract provisions, including an explicit waiver provision, in 
their agreements with state-owned enterprises. Being conscientious of 
the FSIA, effects of explicit waiver provisions, and factors that 
perpetuate litigation and its cost, such as jurisdictional issues dependent 
on the determination of “commercial activity” and a defendant’s right to 
an automatic appeal, strategically allows United States business entities 
to avoid costly, time-consuming legal hurdles and to resolve any disputes 
that may arise between the parties in litigation.  
Therefore, as we open our borders and allow an increase in foreign 
commercial activity in the United States, the mechanism for disposing of 
disputes needs to be reconsidered. Because United States citizens may 
suffer the unintended consequences resulting from foreign governments’ 
and state-owned enterprises’ misuse of the statute, it is time Congress 
revisit the FSIA. 
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APPENDIX 
Aaron Lukken, Esq.* 
Historically, service of process through official channels could only 
be undertaken by Letter Rogatory (Letter of Request), a communication 
from a judge hearing a case, transmitted through diplomatic channels, to 
a judge in the involved foreign country.143 Avenues to service were 
streamlined dramatically with the Convention of 15 November 1965 on 
the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or 
Commercial Matters (Hague Service Convention).  
Now available to United States litigants, to varying degrees dependent 
on destination country, are three means of serving with full respect to the 
law: (1) a request to the destination state’s Central Authority, pursuant to 
Article 5; (2) direct service by postal channels, pursuant to Article 10(a); 
and (3) service effected by judicial officer or other person pursuant to 
Article 10(b) and (c).144 While all member countries must provide Article 
5 access, Article 10 methods are available only where neither the 
originating jurisdiction nor the destination state object.145  
A small handful of countries not party to the Hague Service 
Convention still see a good deal of litigation. These are addressed below 
the Hague member countries in the following grid, which details the 
individual steps involved in serving particular foreign defendants.146 
Unless otherwise noted, methods of service available refer to those 
under articles of the Hague Service Convention and traditional requests 
for international judicial assistance (i.e., Letters Rogatory). The 
timeframes for receipt of proof of service as well as individual countries’ 
  
 * See note on page 625. 
 143. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 988 (9th ed. 2009) (“A document issued by 
one court to a foreign court, requesting that the foreign court (1) take evidence from a 
specific person within the foreign jurisdiction or serve process on an individual or 
corporation within the foreign jurisdiction and (2) return the testimony or proof of service 
for use in a pending case.”). 
 144. Hague Service Convention, supra note 5, arts. 5, 10(a)–(c). 
 145. Id. arts. 5, 10. 
 146. For the Hague Service Convention state membership table, which includes all 
signatories, dates of ratification, and entry into force, see Status Table 14: Convention of 
15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in 
Civil or Commercial Matters, HCCH (Mar. 31, 2016), https://www.hcch.net/en/ 
instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=17 [hereinafter Status Table]. 
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unique and analytical characteristics have been determined from the 
knowledge and experience of Aaron Lukken, Esq., a consulting attorney 
who provides litigation support to United States and Canadian lawyers 
seeking to serve process abroad, compel evidence in foreign countries, 
and enforce judgments overseas. His experience is informed by his 
tenure as a staff attorney with Legal Language Services and his 
management of requests for service abroad. The timeframes and 
analytical characteristics included in the following grid are based on 
historical performance of Central Authorities147 and agents in the field, 
but are not statutorily required or in any way binding.  
 
Hague-
Member 
Country 
Methods 
Available 
Timeframe 
Expected 
(for receipt 
of proof) 
Unique Characteristics 
Canada Central 
Authority 
(Article 5) 
2–4 months, 
depending on 
province 
Canada is, by far, the easiest 
Hague country in which to 
serve, by virtue of its close 
similarity to the U.S. system. 
▪ Canada’s Central Authority 
function is decentralized—
each province and territory 
has its own authority, as 
does the federal government 
in Ottawa.148 
▪ Canadian authorities are not 
likely to reject service re-
quests on sovereignty 
  
 147. Foreign Central Authorities under the Hague Service Convention are 
designated agencies tasked with executing service requests under Article 5 of the 
Convention. Hague Service Convention, supra note 5, arts. 2, 5. 
 148. For an overview of Canada’s central and forwarding authorities as well as the 
methods and costs relating to requests for service, etc., see Canada – Central Authority & 
Practical Information, HCCH (Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.hcch.net/en/states/ 
authorities/details3/?aid=248. For a comprehensive list for Canada’s designated Central 
Authorities and their contact information, see Central Authorities (Articles 2 and Art. 
18(3)), HCCH, https://assets.hcch.net/upload/auth14ca2015en.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 
2016). 
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grounds. 
▪ In Quebec, translation into 
French is required for ser-
vice of initiating documents, 
such as a summons and 
complaint.149 
  Mail  
(Article 
10(a)) 
1 week Notwithstanding § 1608(a)(3) and 
(b)(3), mail service is not advisa-
ble, and very frequently unavaila-
ble in any event (Hague mail ser-
vice is invalid in the 5th and 8th 
Circuits, as well as many individ-
ual federal districts).150 
  Other com-
petent per-
sons  
(Article 
10(b)) 
2–3 weeks Canada’s declarations to the Con-
vention authorize the use of pri-
vate process servers in Anglo-
phone provinces and direct access 
to local hussiers de justice (bail-
iffs) in Quebec.151 
  
 149. Canada – Central Authority & Practical Information, supra note 148.  
 150. Bankston, 889 F.2d at 173–74 (holding that mail is an invalid method of 
service under the Hague Service Convention in the Eighth Circuit); Nuovo Pignone, 310 
F.3d at 384–85 (holding that mail is an invalid method of service under the Hague 
Convention in the Fifth Circuit). 
 151. See generally Canada – Central Authority & Practical Information, supra 
note 148; Declaration/Reservation/Notification, HCCH, https://www.hcch.net/en/ 
instruments/conventions/status-table/notifications/?csid=392&disp=resdn (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2016) (describing Canada’s declarations to the Hague Service Convention). 
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China Central 
Authority 
(Article 5) 
6–9 months China objects to all alternative 
means of Hague service, allowing 
only Article 5 requests. Although 
quite slow in comparison to other 
Hague authorities, the Chinese 
usually execute service requests 
with little fanfare. However, where 
the People’s Republic is itself a 
defendant, plaintiffs should not be 
surprised by a rejected request. In 
such a case, plaintiffs should pro-
ceed directly to § 1608(a)(4) and 
(b)(4), requesting that service be 
effected via the U.S. Department 
of State. 
 
Hong Kong is addressed infra. 
England 
& Wales 
Central 
Authority 
(Article 5) 
2–3 months The English Central Authority is 
relatively efficient, and less likely 
to reject a service request on sov-
ereignty grounds. 
  Mail  
(Article 
10(a)) 
1 week Notwithstanding § 1608(a)(3) and 
(b)(3), mail service is not advisa-
ble, and very frequently unavaila-
ble (Hague mail service is invalid 
in the 5th and 8th Circuits, as well 
as many individual federal dis-
tricts).152 
  Other com-
petent per-
sons  
(Article 
10(b)) 
1–4 weeks Foreign litigants may avail them-
selves of private process servers, 
provided the server is instructed 
by a solicitor.153 
  
 152. Bankston, 889 F.2d at 173–74; Nuovo Pignone, 310 F.3d at 384–85. 
 153. See Declaration/Reservation/Notification, HCCH, https://www.hcch.net/en/ 
states/authorities/status-table/notifications/?csid=427&disp=resdn (last visited Mar. 29, 
2016) (regarding the United Kingdom’s declarations and subsequent diplomatic 
clarification). 
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France Central 
Authority 
(Article 5) 
3–5 months The French Central Authority is 
less likely to reject a service re-
quest on sovereignty grounds. 
  Mail  
(Article 
10(a)) 
1 week Notwithstanding § 1608(a)(3) and 
(b)(3), mail service is not advisa-
ble, and very frequently unavaila-
ble (Hague mail service is invalid 
in the 5th and 8th Circuits, as well 
as many individual federal dis-
tricts).154 
  Other com-
petent per-
sons  
(Article 
10(b)) 
2–4 weeks “Other competent persons” in 
France refers to huissiers de jus-
tice, which are quasi-public offi-
cials, roughly akin to bailiffs or 
sheriffs in common law coun-
tries.155 
When serving private defendants, 
the hussier method is the most 
logical and timely, because the 
Central Authority utilizes huissi-
ers. However, it is unclear whether 
the hussier may serve the French 
Republic or its subdivisions. 
  
 154. Bankston, 889 F.2d at 173–74; Nuovo Pignone, 310 F.3d at 384–85. 
 155. See Its Role, CHAMBRE NATIONALE DES HUISSIERS DE JUSTICE, 
http://www.huissier-justice.fr/en/its-role-324.aspx (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (explaining 
the function of France’s National Chamber of Bailiffs). 
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Germany Central 
Authority 
(Article 5) 
2–4 months, 
depending on 
“Land” 
Germany’s Central Authority 
function is decentralized—each 
“Land” (federal state) has its own 
authority, but the federal govern-
ment does not.156 Moreover, alt-
hough quite efficient, German 
authorities are quite sensitive to 
matters involving German sover-
eignty. Although it is not certain 
that the Berlin authority would 
refuse to serve the federal gov-
ernment, a rejection could not be 
surprising. 
In such a case, plaintiffs should 
proceed directly to § 1608(a)(4) or 
(b)(4), requesting that service be 
effected via the U.S. Department 
of State. 
Hong 
Kong 
Central 
Authority 
(Article 5) 
4–6 months Although officially a part of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
since 1997, Hague methods in 
Hong Kong are more in line with 
English practice than with Chinese 
practice. Translation is not re-
quired, and China allows Article 
10 service in Hong Kong.157 
The Central Authority is a bit 
more efficient than its counterpart 
in Beijing, but is extremely sensi-
tive to any act which might offend 
the PRC. Article 13 (sovereignty) 
rejection would be unsurprising. 
  
 156. See Central Authority of the Lands, HCCH, 
https://assets.hcch.net/upload/auth14_de.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (demonstrating 
Germany’s Central Authority is divided into “Lands” and providing contact information 
of such agencies for requests for service). 
 157. China (Hong Kong) – Other Authority (Art. 18) & Practical Information, 
HCCH (July 9, 2015), https://www.hcch.net/en/states/authorities/details3/?aid=393 
(“Documents have to be in English or Chinese.”). 
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  Mail  
(Article 
10(a)) 
1 week Notwithstanding § 1608(a)(3) and 
(b)(3), mail service is not advisa-
ble, and very frequently unavaila-
ble in any event (Hague mail ser-
vice is invalid in the 5th and 8th 
Circuits, as well as many individ-
ual federal districts).158 
  Other com-
petent per-
sons  
(Article 
10(b)) 
2–4 weeks Foreign litigants may avail them-
selves of service via private agents 
(usually solicitors). However, this 
raises the question of whether 
private agents may serve process 
on a government entity in a for-
eign action. 
India Central 
Authority 
(Article 5) 
9–12 months Of India’s more than one billion 
people, only a single staff member 
works in the Hague Central Au-
thority. As such, the time needed 
to effect service is extraordinarily 
long. That translation is unneces-
sary does little to expedite the 
process. Moreover, litigants 
should be unsurprised if the Au-
thority rejects requests to serve the 
government on sovereignty 
grounds. (Art. 13.). 
In such a case, plaintiffs should 
disregard § 1608(a)(3) and (b)(3), 
as India objects to service by mail. 
Proceed directly to § 1608(a)(4) 
and (b)(4), requesting that service 
be effected via the U.S. Depart-
ment of State. 
  
 158. Bankston, 889 F.2d at 173–74; Nuovo Pignone, 310 F.3d at 384–85. 
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Japan Central 
Authority 
(Article 5) 
4–5 months The Japanese Central Authority is 
highly competent, but culturally 
speaking, quite concerned about 
the sovereign’s reputation. Alt-
hough not a certainty, rejection of 
FSIA service on grounds that it 
violates Japan’s sovereignty would 
not be surprising. 
  Mail  
(Article 
10(a)) 
1 week Japan filed a decidedly vague 
declaration to Article 10(a),159 
indicating that it was not objec-
tionable, but also unlikely to be 
viewed as appropriate. Service on 
the Japanese government by mail 
would most likely be challenged, 
if not ignored altogether. 
In any event, notwithstanding § 
1608(a)(3), (b)(3), mail service is 
not advisable, and very frequently 
unavailable (Hague mail service is 
invalid in the 5th and 8th Circuits, 
as well as many individual federal 
districts).160 
  
 159. See Japan – Central Authority & Practical Information, HCCH (May 15, 
2009), https://www.hcch.net/en/states/authorities/details3/?aid=261 (providing a 
summary of the representative of Japan’s commentary at the Special Commission of 
April 1989 on the practical operation of the Service and Evidence Conventions that 
describes Japan’s declaration to Article 10(a) of the Hague Service Convention); 
Declaration/Reservation/Notification, HCCH, https://www.hcch.net/en/states/authorities/ 
notifications/?csid=407&disp=resdn (last visited Apr. 6, 2016) (demonstrating Japan’s 
declaration to Article 10). 
 160. Bankston, 889 F.2d at 173–74; Nuovo Pignone, 310 F.3d at 384–85. 
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Korea Central 
Authority 
(Article 5) 
4–5 months The Korean Central Authority is 
highly competent but, like its Chi-
nese and Japanese neighbors, is 
concerned about the sovereign’s 
reputation. Although not a certain-
ty, rejection of FSIA service on 
grounds that it violates Korea’s 
sovereignty would not be surpris-
ing. 
In such a case, plaintiffs should 
disregard § 1608(a)(3) and (b)(3), 
as Korea objects to service by 
mail. Proceed directly to § 
1608(a)(4) and (b)(4), requesting 
that service be effected via the 
U.S. Department of State. 
Mexico Central 
Authority 
(Article 5) 
9–12 months As the expected timeframe indi-
cates, Mexico’s handling of Hague 
requests is not expeditious. Liti-
gants should be unsurprised if the 
Authority rejects requests to serve 
the government on sovereignty 
grounds (Art. 13). 
In such a case, plaintiffs should 
disregard § 1608(a)(3) and (b)(3), 
as Mexico objects to service by 
mail. Proceed directly to § 
1608(a)(4) and (b)(4), requesting 
that service be effected via the 
U.S. Department of State. 
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Switzer-
land 
Central 
Authority 
(Article 5) 
2–4 months, 
depending on 
Canton 
The Swiss Central Authority 
function is decentralized with a 
separate designation for each can-
ton, akin to a province or federal 
state.161 
Although it is uncertain whether 
a request to serve a FSIA claim in 
Switzerland would be rejected 
under Article 13, it remains a pos-
sibility. 
In such a case, plaintiffs should 
disregard § 1608(a)(3) and (b)(3), 
as India objects to service by mail. 
Proceed directly to § 1608(a)(4) 
and (b)(4), requesting that service 
be effected via the U.S. Depart-
ment of State.  
Non-
Hague 
Countries 
Methods 
Available 
Timeframe 
Expected 
Unique Characteristics 
Austria Letter 
Rogatory 
4–5 months Austria is not a member of the 
Hague Service Convention and 
has no similar treaty relationship 
with the United States,162 so § 
1608(a)(2) and (b)(2) are inappli-
cable. Where an agency or instru-
mentality of the foreign state is to 
be served, Letters Rogatory fall 
specifically under § 1608(b)(3). 
  
 161. Switzerland – Central Authority & Practical Information, HCCH (Apr. 5, 
2016), https://www.hcch.net/en/states/authorities/details3/?aid=276 (explaining that 
Switzerland has multiple Central Authorities); see also Liste des Autorités Centrales 
Contonales pour L’entraide Judiciaire en Matière Civile et Commerciale, 
SCHWEIZERISCHE EIDENOSSENSCHAFT (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.rhf.admin.ch/rhf/fr/ 
home/zivil/behoerden/zentral.html (listing Switzerland’s Central Authorities and their 
contact information). 
 162. See Status Table, supra note 146; see also Details, HCCH, 
https://www.hcch.net/en/states/hcch-members/details1/?sid=23 (last visited Apr. 6, 2016) 
(listing treaties to which Austria is bound). 
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  Mail  1 week Mail service would likely be ig-
nored, if it is even successfully 
delivered. U.S. litigants should 
follow mail service with a request 
to the U.S. Department of State 
under § 1608(a)(4) and (b)(4). 
Philip-
pines 
Letter 
Rogatory  
Unlikely to 
ever be ef-
fected 
The State Department advises that 
Letters Rogatory are highly un-
likely to ever be processed by 
Philippine officials.163 
  Service by 
agent/local 
counsel 
n/a This is not a valid method to serve 
the state or political subdivision 
under § 1608(a).164 
 
Local counsel may petition for 
service on an agency or instrumen-
tality under § 1608(b)(3)(C). 
  Mail  1 week Mail service would likely be ig-
nored, if it is even successfully 
delivered. U.S. litigants should 
follow mail service with a request 
to the U.S. Department of State 
under § 1608(a)(4) or (b)(4). 
  
 163. See supra note 13 (providing that patterns among individual countries’ 
approaches to accepting service of process, here the Philippines, have been determined 
from the knowledge and experience of Aaron Lukken, Esq.).  
 164. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a) (providing an exhaustive list of valid service methods 
that does not include service by agent). 
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Singapore Letter 
Rogatory  
5–6 months Singapore is not a member of the 
Hague Service Convention and 
has no similar treaty relationship 
with the United States,165 and thus, 
§ 1608(a)(2) and (b)(2) are inap-
plicable. Still, if the foreign minis-
try is willing to convey a Letter 
Rogatory—and a court is willing 
to execute that Letter, the “special 
arrangement” channel in § 
1608(a)(1) might be fulfilled. 
  
Where an agency or instrumentali-
ty of the foreign state is to be 
served, Letters Rogatory fall spe-
cifically under § 1608(b)(3). 
  Service by 
agent/local 
counsel 
n/a This is not a valid method to serve 
the state or political subdivision 
under § 1608(a).166 
  
Local counsel may petition for 
service on an agency or instrumen-
tality under § 1608(b)(3)(C). 
  Mail  1 week Mail service would likely be ig-
nored, if it is even successfully 
delivered. U.S. litigants should 
follow mail service with a request 
to the U.S. Department of State 
under § 1608(a)(4) or (b)(4). 
  
 165. See Status Table, supra note 146; see also Details, HCCH, 
https://www.hcch.net/en/states/hcch-members/details1/?sid=128 (last visited Apr. 6, 
2016) (listing treaties to which Singapore is bound). 
 166. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a). 
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Taiwan Letter 
Rogatory  
6–9 months Because it is not recognized as a 
sovereign, Taiwan is not a mem-
ber of the Hague Service Conven-
tion or other service treaty. Ac-
cordingly, § 1608(a)(2) and (b)(2) 
are inapplicable. Still, if Taiwan’s 
foreign ministry is willing to con-
vey a Letter Rogatory—and a 
court is willing to execute that 
Letter, the “special arrangement” 
channel in § 1608(a)(1) might be 
fulfilled. 
  
Where an agency or instrumentali-
ty of the foreign state is to be 
served, Letters Rogatory fall spe-
cifically under § 1608(b)(3). 
  Service via 
agent/local 
counsel 
n/a Not a valid method to serve the 
state or political subdivision under 
§ 1608(a).167 
  
Local counsel may petition for 
service on an agency or instrumen-
tality under § 1608(b)(3)(C). 
  Mail  1 week Mail service would likely be ig-
nored, if it is even successful. U.S. 
litigants should follow mail ser-
vice with a request to the U.S. 
Department of State under § 
1608(a)(4) or (b)(4). 
 
 
  
 167. Id. 
 
